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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS DANKS, 
Pla.i ntif f-A ppellant, 
-vs-
JOHN W. TURNER, Warrl.en, ) 
Utah State Prison, 
Dcfondant-Rrsponde11t. 
Case No. 
10513 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NA 11URE OF CASE 
The appellant, Thomas Danks, a prisoner confined 
in the Utah State Prison, appeals from a judgment of 
the District Court of the Second .J ndieial District, Weber 
County, denying his application for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On November 10, 1965, the appellant filed a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of 'Veber 
1 
County, State of Utah, alk•ging that his eounsel during 
the course of his trial on till• <'hargf' of robb0ry was in-
competent, and alleging, furtht'r, that there was new 
1 
evidence which would prove hii'i innoct>nce. A hearing 
was held on December 10, EJGC>, at which time the court 
denied the appellant's 1wtition for writ of habeas rorpus 
and remanded the appellant to tlw custody of the War-
den of the Utah StatP Prison. ::.\ o final order was ever 
entered by the district court denying the appellant's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. A notice of appeal 
was filed by the appellant, and l\lr. J imi .Mitsunaga, the 
legal defender of Salt Lah County, was appointed as 
his counsel. Thereafter, a dispuh• arose bf>tween the ap-
pellant and .Mr. Mitsunaga, l\I r . .Mitsunaga withdrew 
and Mr. Sheldon A. Vincenti, his pres<:'llt attorney, was 
appointed to represent him. 
REILIEF SOUGHT OK APPEAL 
Respond1mt submits that thl' appPal should be dis-
missed for lack of a final order, or, in the alternative, 
the decision of the trial court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of 
facts: 
The only issue rai~ed in the appellant's brief is that 
the trial court PrrNl in not appointing eounsel for him 
to repr<:>sent him on his motion for new trial after his 
trial on the chargP of robbery. 
2 
The appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus alleging two grounds for relief: ( 1) incompetent 
counsel and (2) newly discovered evidence (R. 1). The 
trial court at the time of }waring agreed that the con-
tention that the appellant did not have counsel at the 
time o.f his motion for new trial was not a part of the 
petition, but allowed tht> appellant to raise the issue 
(rrr. 66). The record disclo8e8 that there has never been 
a final order entered denying the appellant's application 
for writ of habt>as corpus. The only thing in the record 
indicating that the motion was denied is the court's 
statement in the tram;cript, page 75, and a minute entry 
(R. 7). 
A transcript of the testimony and proceedings at 
the time of the appellant's motion for new trial does not 
appear of record. Appellant was rPpresented at the time 
of his trial at preliminary lu•aring by Mr. Philip S. Ken-
nPy. A tram;cript of the proc1·edings subsequent to pre-
liminary hearing indicates that at the time of the appel-
lant's arraignment, he indicated that he wanted .Mr. Ken-
ney to withdraw and that Mr. Kenney withdrew and that 
thereafter, the court appointed :Mr. L. G. Bingham . 
.Mr. Bingham testified that he had consulted with 
Mr. Danks, but had stated he did not take the case since 
Mr. Danks ''ms unwilling to pay him (Tr. 58), and that, 
thereafter, the court appointed him as counsel to repre-
sent Mr. Danks. Mr. Bingham represented the appellant 
throughout the trial. At the time of hearing, Mr. Danks 
testified: 
3 
· "Q. Now after the jun- found you guilt~' on ,J nnr· 
24:, of 1959, was Mr. Bingham your attorner 
after that ? · 
A. No. I went down to the prison, and I filed a 
motion for re-trial lwfore .T udge Cowley. 
Q. Who filed a motion? 
A. I did. 
Q. Had you fired Mr. Bingliam at that time? 
A.. \Vell the jur:- trial was over. 
Q. Yes. 
A. And I thought that was over and done with 
between him and llll', you know. Then I filed 
my own motion for a re-trial that came be-
fon~ Judge Cowley, I felt Mr. Bingham was 
incompetent, and Mr. Cowlelj appointed Mr. 
·Bingham to rcprl';-;!'11t 111c on my motion fnr 
n re-trial. I fire.cl illr. Bingham, asked him 
to withdraw fro111 the case, asked .Judge 
Cowley to gPt 111<' anotlwr attorney. H <' said 
well you're hen>, and we will hear the argu-
ment now. He didn't give me another attor-
ney." 
The court express!:· found with n'f erence to the 
. . 
motion for new trial (Tr. 73): 
"So far as the motion for new trial, the Court ' 
chooses to beliew Tonm1Y Danks tf>stimonv that 
he did request that anoth~r counsel be app~inted. 
The Court heliPYPS that mH·e being supplied with 
counsel for trial sn far as the Court i:;; aware 1 
this counsel has been lo:·al to him and attempter1 
to do the be8t he could, and that his counsel was 
competent. The Court believes nmY that the de-
fendant is not required tn have counsel at an 
4 
argument for rn·\\· trial and doP:-:; not beliPve that 
thf' rPquirenwnt i:-:; denovo and doe:-; not believe 
that tlw Conrt has to g-ivP to the dPf Pndant who 
has dis<'hargPd c·om1s .. J, oncP appointed, compe-
h>nt to serw and who is discharged without any 
apparent canst", ,,·ith a ne\\· counsel." 
There is no evidence as to whether the motion for 
new trial was time!>· filt><l. ln addition, at the tiu1p of the 
appellant's application for \Hit of habeas corpu:-:;, the 
court }u•ard all tlw :-:;o~called 1wwly discovered evidence, 
including the tc:-:;tirnony of .:\Ir. Bill ~ubold, the com-
plaining ~witnes:-:;. Thert· was, in d'fe<'t, a eomplete re-trial 
of thP ea:-:;e on tlw question of whdher there was any 
newly dit-ieovered evideIH'f'. The court ruled that there 
was no showing of any 1wwly diseoverl'd evidt·nce so as 
to grant rPlief by habeas eorpus. 1 
Ba8ed on the above evidt·11ee, tlw trial court orally 
clenil'd the pl'tition for \nit of habeas corpu:-:;. 
ARGli~lEKT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
SINCE NO FINAL ORDER DENYING HIS APPLI-
CATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS HAS 
BEEN ENTERED. 
1 The trial court was in error in considering the question 
of newly discovered evidence by habeas corpus, since 
this only applies for consideration on an application for 
coram nobis. However, the issue is not germane to this 
appeal, except to show that the appellant was afforded a 
full opportunity to present his evidence. 
5 
The record does not dernonstrah> that there wa~ 
any final order Pntered h:v the l Ttah ('Ollli denying the 
appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus. It i~, 
of <'ourse, the cm;tom for eonns<'l to pn-'pare an ordrr 
for the eourt to execuh'. I lo\H'YPr, in tlie absence of a 
final order, there can lw no ap1ieal to this court. 
In Aldridge v. Beckstead, 1() l'.:2d 136, :396 P.2d 870 
( 1964), an appeal was takPn from an allPg<-'d denial of a 
writ of habeas eorpus in an l'Xtradition prcweeding. rn1i8 I 
court noted that there had lire11 110 fi11al order e11tercd 
and stated: 
"The record before us refh,ds no final appealable 
judgment. Thus, our juris(liction fails." 
It is subrnitt>d, therefon•, that thl' instant appeal ' 
should be disrnissPd on tlH' g-rounds that there has been 
no final onll-'l' entt>red in th(' trial court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
THE APPELLANT'S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE 
DID NOT HA VE COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF 
HEARING ON HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
SINCE CA) THE APPELLANT HAD HAD COUNSEL 
APPOINTED IN HIS BEHALF AND UNJUSTIFI-
ABLY DISCHARGED HIM, AND CONSEQUENTLY, 
THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL, CB) THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT 
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS TIMELY 
FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UTAH CODE 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, <C) THE SAME IS-
6 
SUES WHICH WERE APPARENTLY PRESENTED 
IN THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WERE HEARD 
BY THE TRIAL COURT ON H./\.BEAS CORPUS AND 
FOUND TO BE WITHOUT MERIT, AND (DJ THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DO NOT IN-
DICATE THAT THERE WAS A CRITICAL STAGE 
REQUIRING THE AI'POINTl\IENT OF COUNSEL. 
A. The record in this eaf'e clearly discloses that the 
trial court did not conuuit t•rror in failing to appoint 
another attorney for the appdlant to argue his motion 
for a new trial. Appellant had eoum;t'l at the time of his 
preliminary hearing and at the time of his anaignment 
in the district court, dischargPd counsel. He told Judge 
Cowley that lw did not desire a ''eivil attorney", but he 
' wanted collllSPl who would n·prest>nt him in the manner 
hP wantf~d to lw rt>pn•sPnkd. ;\lr. Danks had, himself, 
previously contacted j\( r. Bingham ahom representation, 
hut apparently, lweaUSP or lack of fumh;, ~Ir. Bingham 
, was unwilling to take the case. ,Judgt' Cowley thereafter 
appoinh'd 1\1 r. Bingham to rPpr<'sent the appellant. 
Thus, appellant had appoinfr<l colmsel of his own ehoice. 
1 Subsequent to the time of trial, by the appellant's own 
admission, he dischargPd l\fr. Bingham, when Judge 
Cowley said hP would make ~lr. Bingham available to 
argue the motion. ThP trial eourt expressly found that 
' there was no justifiable basis for thP discharge. 
lTnder these circumstances, the appellant is m no 
position to complain about the absence of counsel. Coun-
~rl who was most familiar with the ease and who would 
haw hePn of assi:;;t<uwe to tlw appellant in presenting 
7 
his motion for new trial was fi l'(•d h>· the appellant. , 
There is no unending duty on tlw part of the court to 
continue to apvoint counsel aft(•r the defrndant in a ca~e 
1 
unjustifiably fires counsel. 
1t is well svttled that thp right to appointed coumel , 
does not include with it tlw right of the defendant to 
dictak his ehoice of eolmsPl. Tlw ehoice of counsel is 
for the court. Prtitio11 of Correla, 352 P.2d Gl6 (Hawaii 
1960) ; l Tula rd<' 1.·. Pen ple, ;)!l!) P.2d 2-!5 (Colo. 1965). 
In People 1·. Henley, 2 ~lich. App. 5-!, 138 N.W. 2d 
515 (1965), the .Michigan Court of Avp(~ah; ruled that 
where the defendant ha<l had three• appointed counsel 1 
and discharged tlwm, that it "as not neepssary for the , 
, . ' 
trial court to appoiu t additional eounsel for the de-
fendant. 
In Arellanes i:. U11ited States, 3:l3 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 
1965), the court ruled that w hl'l'l' the defendant had man- ~ 
euvered himself into a position that lw was without coun-
sel, and it appeared that the adion was deliberate on the 
part of the defendant, dnc proePss was not denied by 
the failurl' of the defendant to have eounsel. 
In Rogers v. U 11ited Stutes, 3:2G F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 
1963), the court said, s1Jeaking of the right of a defen- 1 
dant to have counsel appointed to assist him: 
"But he has no right to continued service, nor to 
counsel of his choice, nor to dictate the procedural 
coun:p of his representation." 
In People i. l'alJb, .319 P.~d 656 (Cal. App. 1957), 
the California court said: 
8 
''A~suming for th0 rnonwnt that tlw appellant is 
enhtlPd to have a C'ourt appointed attorney to 
~rnsi1;t him in his appPal, he surely is not entitled 
to have thP C'ourt appoint one attornev after an-
otht>r nntil an attornt>y wholly satisfac.tory to ap-
pPllant is iwlected. No :·m('lt a proc!::dure was ever 
contemplated in the law." 
In State i:. Ri11aldi, 156 A.:2cl 28, 58 N.J. Super. 209 
(1959), it was stated: 
" ... It i1; P11011gh that t}w attornt'!. assigned to tl10 
appeal is qualified to rt->pre::-;ent the prisoner, and 
that hP has advi1;ecl with him and done whatever 
possihlP to repn'sPn t him C'Olllf H'tentl~·. Coum;el 
is not required to danee to the prisoner's tune. 
Those unfortunat<' <'nough to lw caught up in tlw 
web of the law and who, mistakenly or not, con-
sidl'r thf'ms0lvPs aggri<>v0d must disabuse them-
selves of th0 notion now pn'vailing in C'ertain 
prison circles that thPy Illa~' accept or rejeet as-
sig-ned eonnsel, as whim or scheme dictates. The 
right to assigned counsel is not the right to pick 
an attorn<>y of on0's own <'hoosing, nor the right 
to sel0d (•otmsel who "·ill ('Ompletely satisfy a 
defendant's fancy as to how he is to be repre-
sented." 
In the Rinaldi case, the rourt ruled that where a de-
fendant fired his appointed appellate counsel, he was 
not thereafter entitled to the appointment of new counsel. 
The Rinaldi case was cited with ~ipproval by the 
United States Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Bell, 11 · U.S.C.M.A. 306, 29 C.M.R. 122 (1960), in an 
opinion by J ndge Latimer The court stated with refer-
9 
ence to action on the part of a defrndant m refm;in" 
I") 
counsel: 
"H owt:>ver, if an acewwd protesb against such an ' 
ordPr and insists on firing his appointed lawyer.~, 
1 
he cannot later <'Olllplain if th<> hoard conclude, 
not to rPquin• c·mmsPI 1o n•main in the case, for 
an acens<>d who is saiw ean alwavs forfeit his 
right to reprPsmtation lH'f'ore th1· board, and ac-
tions showing an arhit rar~· and <·alculated rpfusal 
to aecPpt appointed <·ounsPl ma~- c·om;titutc an 
abandonmPnt of that right" 
In the instant cast·, thl' appellant had diseharged 
appan•ntly without just eau;.;e hoth of his prior attor-
ney::;. The trial court in thi;.; ca;.;<' found that the dis-
chargP was unwarrankd. l. nd!•r tlwse c·ircmm;tanccs, it ' 
must be con<'ludPd that th1· ap1wllant forfeitf'd his right 
to representation by appointed c•oum;el at the time of 
hi::; motion for a new trial. 
B. The record in the instant ease is silent as to ' 
whether the motion for a nf'w trial was even within the 
jurisdiction of the trial court. 
f.;ection 77-38-+, l; tah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides that the application for a Ill'W trial must be made 
upon written notice of motion dP;.;ignating the grounds 
upon which it is made and mm:;t he filed within five days 
after the rendition of the verdict or dPcision. If it is 
based upon a contPntion of newl~· dii:;covered evidence, 
affidavits are rt'fJ.Uired. Since the appellant in this case 1 
did not demonstratE:- that his motion met the jurisdic· 
tional prerequisih>c', it cannot be said that the trial court 
committNl an~ nror m refusing to f'ntertain his writ 
10 
of habeas corpus on thP basis of lack of eounsel at the 
time of his motion for new trial. 
C. In the ease of State '" Danks. 10 L:.2a 162, 350 
P.2d HG (1960), the prc8ent appellant'~ case was re-
viewed by this court and affirn1tid. The appellant was 
represented by Mr. Walter R. Ellett. r:L'he court found 
the evidence sufficient 38 a rnatter of law to ~mstain the 
evidence. 2 
The appellant at the time of his hearing on his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus was represented by 
counsel and was given an opportunity to vresent all the 
newly discovered evidenc<> he contended would warrant 
a new trial. The appellant's father was called as a wit-
ness, the victim of the robbery, imuate8 from the Prison, 
police officern and other iwrson8. Ln effrd, tlw appellant 
was grantPd a complPte rPhParing on his ease. The pre-
sentation of the l•videnc<• and the exploration of the 
iss1u's on habeas corpus suhstantiall~· exceeded that 
which would hav<' bPPU available for determination on 
a motion for nP\\' trial. Appellant, therefore, had avail-
able to him at the tilllt' of trial in tlw proc<'eding from 
which he now appeals all tlw opportunity to present evi-
dence that he would havP had on hi:-; motion for a new 
trial, and he was represented by able counsel. Conse-
CjUP~tly, it cannot he said that tlH· denial of coum;el at 
the time of the motion for new trial nmv warrant8 relief 
by habeas eorpus. 
2 It is interesting to note that the absence of assigned 
counsel at the motion for a new trial was not assigned 
as error on appeal. 
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In Myers v. Hadley, lG F:2rl +OJ, +02 P.:2d 701 (1960), 
this eourt h0ld that an indivirlual in an C'xtradition prn-
ceeding was not denied hi:-; eonstitutional right to coum;el 
where he appean~d hefore a <'ity court \vithout counsel 
when on a subsequent district rnnrt hearing on petition 
for writ of hab1:1as corpus h<' \ms afforded a full oppor-
tunity with the aid of coum-wl to present all matters 
concerning his extradition. Thi:::; eourt :,,;tated: 
"Plaintiff was not denied due pro<'PSS of law be-
cause he was not reprPsPnted hy eourt-appointed 
<'OUns<'l at the !waring hl:'fore tlw Ogden City 
Court. 'l'he denial of conn:-;Pl at that stage of the 
proeePdings did not pn'.iudieP Ow plaintiff who 
had full opportunity to }H'P:-;ent with the aid of 
counsl:'l any and all rnatt(•rs relating to his extra-
dition at th<· h('aring- in th<' district court upon 
his pdition for writ of habPas corpus. 
Affirmed." 
In State u. Bitrke, 28 Wis. 2<l 1!:13, J:)6 N.\V. ~d 829 I 
( 1965), the \Visconsin Nupre111p Court ruled that where ! 
a defendant had not bPl'n provided c·ounsel at his mental 
commitment procPeding in 19~l~l, that granting him coun-
sel at a habeas corpus !waring in \\-hich the same matters 
were presented in 196+, eorreeted any defect. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the habeas corpus ' 
proceeding in this ca:-;c cured any defect by the failure 
of the appellant to haw counsel appointed at his hearing 
1 
on his motion for a new trial. l<~tipPeially is this true in 
view of thP fact that thif' eourt thoroug-hl~- eonsidered thl' 
same issll<'S on a11pcal and found them unmeritorious. 
12 
D. It may be that a motion for new trial may be-
come a critical stage in a proceeding and that a defen-
dant may be entitled to courn:;el, if, becaGse o.f the nature 
of the motion for new trial and the issues raised, the 
necessity of counsel is manifest. Bland v. Alabama, ..... . 
F.2d ______ (5th Cir. 12/27 /65) ; 2 Criminal Law Bulletin, 
p. 39. However, it is submitted that in the nature of this 
case, where the arguments were merely a rehash of the 
evidence before the trial court and therP are no special 
legal technicalities involved, that a motion for new trial 
would not be a critical stage. 
Recently, in Dirring 1-. [-11ite.d Stutes, 353 F.2d 519 
(lst Cir. 1965), a claim was made that the trial court 
erred in not appointing counsd to argue the petitioner's 
motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The First Cireuit rejected the 
contention, stating: 
"There remains the question of whether the court 
erred in failing to appoint <'ounsel to prosecute 
the motion for new trial. Appellant had counsel 
'through appeal,' as required by the Criminal 
.Justice A<"t, 18 U.S.C. ~· 300(iA(c). 'Ve do not con-
strue that phrase to includP motions for new trial. 
Nor do we so interpret the Sixth Amendment. 
There must be an end. Cf. United States v .. John-
son, supra. After final conviction the appoint-
ment of counsel must rest in the discretion of the 
court. \Ve see no abuse of di::;cretion in this case. 
Cf. United States <'X rd. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 
2 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 707. 
Affirmed." 
13 
Consequent!~-, it is subrnited that when• in the in-
stant case the appt>llant had coun:wl at preliminary hear. 
ing, eouns<>l at the tillH' of trial, <·ounsl'I on ap1wal, and 
there was no demonstration that tlw appelant was not 
otherwisP afforded full opportunity to present his evi-
dence both at the time of his trial and on his petition for 
writ of habea:-; eorpus, that it <·annot he said that there ! 
is an:v basis for reversal lw<'aus1' of a failnn' to have 
counsel at th1' time of a motion for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant appeal dPmonstrates that the appellant 
is entitled to no n•lief. The soh• cont<>ntion is that the 
appellant was not afforded c·ounsel at the time of his 
motion for nP\V trial. Ap1JPllant had eounsl'l at the time 
of preliminary hearing and disd1arged him. Appellant 
had counsel at the ti1111• of trial and, thl'reafter, prior tu 
his motion for new trial, disC'harged appointed counsel. 
It was not incumbent upon tlw trial court to eontinue to 
appoint one counsel aft1•r anotlwr to argue appellant's 
case when there was no manifest demonstration that the 
special intprests of jm;tice requi r<'cl new counsel. Fur· 1 
ther, appellant was afforded full opportunity at the , 
time of his habeas corpus hearing to present issues on 
the question of tlH• sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
his conviction and newly discoverPd evidence. In addi-
tion, the appellant had an appeal and counsel reprP· 1 
• . I 
sented him on appeal. This eourt found no merit to an> · 
of the contentiom on appeal. 
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It is therefore submitted that there is no. basis for 
reversal and that this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
.\ttorneys for Respondent 
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